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Comment
CONTRACT FIXER UPPER: ADDRESSING THE INADEQUACY OF
THE FORCE MAJEURE DOCTRINE IN PROVIDING RELIEF
FOR NONPERFORMANCE IN THE WAKE OF
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
AMY SPARROW PHELPS*
I. A NEW INFECTION CHANGES THE WORLD AND THREATENS CONTRACTS
EVERYWHERE
In early January 2020, researchers in China announced a new discov-
ery: a mysterious, pneumonialike illness presented through a coronavirus
pathogen.1  At the time, infectious disease experts were not sure how the
novel coronavirus might spread or whether its impact would be different
from that of other twenty-first century outbreaks.2  However, the novel
coronavirus, also called SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19, quickly spread around
the world.3  Within a month of the discovery, COVID-19 spread to every
province in the People’s Republic of China and to twenty other countries,
prompting the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare the COVID-
19 outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern.”4  Just
* J.D. Candidate 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2015, Harvard College.  This Comment is dedicated to John and Emma
Phelps, and to the Sparrow family.  Thank you for your tremendous love and
support, in law school and always.  Thank you also to the staff of Villanova Law
Review for their thoughtful edits and support in developing this Comment.
1. See Sui-Lee Wee & Donald G. McNeil Jr., From Jan. 2020: China Identifies New
Virus Causing Pneumonialike Illness, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/01/08/health/china-pneumonia-outbreak-virus.html [https://
perma.cc/5CPL-7J7P] (reporting news of novel coronavirus).
2. See id. (reporting medical analysis at time of initial coronavirus outbreak
and comparing to SARS and MERS outbreaks).
3. See Kristian G. Andersen et al., The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2, 26 NATURE
MED. 450, 450 (2020) (noting “widespread” infection linked to virus strain in
March 2020); see also Joshua Berlinger, Coronavirus Has Now Spread to Every Conti-
nent Except Antarctica, CNN (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/25/
asia/novel-coronavirus-covid-update-us-soldier-intl-hnk/index.html [https://
perma.cc/5FCF-36FW] (reporting COVID-19’s spread to every continent except
Antarctica).
4. COVID 19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-
19-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-and-
innovation-forum [https://perma.cc/2QXN-VK75] (announcing the WHO’s deci-
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six weeks later, on March 11, 2020, the WHO declared a global
pandemic.5
In response to the evolving health crisis, leaders around the world
told their citizens to stay at home to prevent the spread of the virus.6  Day-
to-day activities came to an abrupt stop.7  As businesses around the world
halted production and distribution, parties to contracts in almost every
industry saw their carefully negotiated agreements shattered.8  From col-
lapsing economies to astounding death tolls, the dramatic and ongoing
effects of COVID-19 are unprecedented.9  Indeed, no previously docu-
5. See Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 29,
2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https:/
/perma.cc/JT5X-KJS2] (noting the WHO’s assessment that COVID-19 should be
characterized as a pandemic based on the “alarming levels of spread and severity”
of the novel coronavirus).
6. See Neal R. Marder & Ali R. Rabbani, Event Cancellations Spawn a New Wave
of COVID-19 Consumer Class Actions, 27 NO. 05 WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION 01 (2020)
(referencing stay-at-home orders promulgated by state and local jurisdictions in
response to surges of cases of COVID-19 in June 2020).
7. See, e.g.,  Michael Levenson, Scale of China’s Wuhan Shutdown Is Believed to Be
Without Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/
22/world/asia/coronavirus-quarantines-history.html [https://perma.cc/D2N4-
DR56] (detailing China’s method of sequestering the population of Wuhan in a
novel “shutdown”); Weizhen Tan & Riya Bhattacharjee, California Governor Issues
Statewide Order to ‘Stay at Home’ as Coronavirus Cases Soar, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/19/california-governor-issues-statewide-order-to-
stay-at-home-effective-thursday-evening.html [https://perma.cc/G8H6-2STB] (an-
nouncing California governor Gavin Newsom’s March announcement to “stay at
home” during the coronavirus outbreak); see also Rebecca Wright, The World’s Larg-
est Coronavirus Lockdown Is Having a Dramatic Impact on Pollution in India, CNN (Apr.
1, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/31/asia/coronavirus-lockdown-impact-
pollution-india-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/9JRH-QMLS] (noting In-
dia’s lockdown order caused all markets, places of worship, public transportation,
and construction to cease operations).
8. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ON-
LINE 48, 48 (2020) (noting that both the pandemic and accompanying government
safety measures “ha[ve] prevented countless people, babysitters to basketball play-
ers, from fulfilling their contracts”); Lillianna Byington, Coronavirus Is the Latest
Challenge to Face Dairy Industry, FOOD DIVE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://
www.fooddive.com/news/coronavirus-is-the-latest-challenge-to-face-dairy-industry/
574344/ [https://perma.cc/CM23-TRN3] (summarizing halted distribution chan-
nels and supply chain disruptions for dairy producers); Leslie Josephs, Coronavirus
Brings Boeing’s US Airplane Production to a Halt, CNBC (Apr. 6, 2020), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/04/06/boeing-to-suspend-787-production-in-south-carolina-
until-further-notice-due-to-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/UJ9X-ATYP] (re-
porting shuttering of Boeing’s production facilities in South Carolina and Seattle
in response to the governors’ “stay-at-home” orders and coronavirus infections,
respectively).
9. See, e.g., Calvin Woodward, Huge Spending, Near Unprecedented Deaths: The
Surreal Stats of the COVID Year, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2021), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/vaccine/ct-aud-nw-covid-19-one-year-stats-
20210313-m45nv4lqprfbzmrp5uxdrwpq5y-story.html [https://perma.cc/DYG6-
AKJC] (reporting “numbers beyond ordinary comprehension” one year into the
COVID-19 pandemic’s presence in the United States).  In December 2020, Ameri-
can virologist and then-director of the U.S. Centers for Disease and Prevention Dr.
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mented viral outbreak has caused the same degree of economic devasta-
tion as COVID-19.10  However, the modern world has experienced
pandemics before, including the 1918 flu pandemic, the global SARS out-
break in 2003, and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.11  These pandemics, as well
as other global health crises, have already prompted careful contempla-
tion and scholarship around how global businesses and contracts could be
affected by a modern outbreak.12  In fact, some scholars had even pre-
dicted how force majeure clauses could be invoked if a pandemic brought
society to a halt long before COVID-19 was discovered.13
Throughout the COVID-19 global pandemic, businesses and consum-
ers continuously faced unfulfilled contracts due to the virus.14  Some
scholars and practitioners have suggested that adding specific language
around a “pandemic” should become a part of the boilerplate force
majeure clauses in contracts.15  However, organizations should not ex-
Robert Redfield contextualized COVID-19’s impact, noting it “is the leading cause
of death,” and that the upcoming months would be “the most difficult time in the
public health history of this nation.” Id.; see also Thomas Marcey, Could COVID-19
Serve as the Grounds for a Force Majeure Defense to Contractual Noncompliance?, 2020-5
CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS NL 1 (2020) (“The general issue of the legal effect on
contract performance of extraordinary, unforeseen events has been explored . . .
before, but never in the context of a catastrophic, worldwide illness such as covid-
19.” (footnote omitted)).
10. See Chelsey Cox, Fact Check: COVID-19 Is Deadlier than the 1918 Spanish Flu
and Seasonal Influenza, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/factcheck/2020/08/20/fact-check-covid-19-deadlier-than-1918-span-
ish-flu-seasonal-flu/3378208001/ [https://perma.cc/E6WA-NHPE] (explaining
COVID-19’s infection mortality ratio, death toll, and rate of spread have lead some
scientists to conclude COVID-19 is more deadly than the seasonal flu and the 1918
flu pandemic); Money Morning, What Are the Economic Impacts of COVID-19?,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-are-
the-economic-impacts-of-covid-19-2020-08-25 [https://perma.cc/2UTC-QMXM]
(acknowledging that “global markets are seeing trillions of dollars disappear as the
economic impact of coronavirus wreaks havoc on economies across the world”).
11. See generally 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 Virus), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-h1n1.
html [https://perma.cc/55JE-N6RV] (last visited May 10, 2021) (detailing the
1918–19 influenza pandemic that circulated around the world); Frequently Asked
Questions About SARS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.html [https://perma.cc/V3MS-CZFN] (last visited
May 10, 2021) (describing magnitude of the 2003 “global SARS outbreak”); 2009
H1N1 Pandemic Timeline, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-pandemic-timeline.html [https://
perma.cc/6QP5-HT3Z] (last visited May 10, 2021) (reporting timeline of events
related to the H1N1 pandemic in 2009).
12. For a further discussion of scholars’ predictions, see infra notes 123–29
and accompanying text.
13. See id.
14. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 48 (listing examples of contracts that have
been affected by COVID-19).
15. See, e.g., Andrew Satter, Force Majeure Clauses Hard to Invoke, Even in Pan-
demic, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (May 4, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/prod-
uct/blaw/document/X2R6VIJS000000 [https://perma.cc/3Q4Q-GB77]
(predicting that “pandemics” will be included in force majeure clauses in the fu-
3
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pand force majeure clauses because existing doctrines do much of the
work that could otherwise be achieved through a force majeure clause,
and expanding force majeure clauses only causes courts to read clauses
even more narrowly.16  In fact, most jurisdictions that have contemplated
COVID-19 as a force majeure event have determined that it is a force
majeure event; but that isn’t enough to succeed in a force majeure
claim.17  The force majeure event must otherwise fulfill the requirements
of the force majeure clause and notification requirements required by
contract.18  Instead of jumping to expanding the force majeure clause to
include “pandemic” for the next earth-altering global crisis, organizations
would be better off relying on a highly specific force majeure clause, or
even none at all, to prepare for a future continuously plagued with global
crises.19
This Comment argues that expanding force majeure clauses in re-
sponse to a global crisis like COVID-19 is not an efficient application of
the force majeure doctrine based on the legal outcomes for parties at-
tempting to invoke force majeure for contract nonperformance during
the pandemic.20  This Comment does not take issue with the way courts
have decided cases when parties attempt to invoke force majeure.21
Rather, it compels practitioners to recognize the pattern of not enforcing
force majeure clauses and consider other ways to draft contracts that leave
more options available for parties when the most unexpected things
happen.22
Part I explores the background of the force majeure doctrine, includ-
ing the history and purpose of the force majeure clause and how it has
ture); see also Bodhisattwa Majumder & Devashish Giri, Article, Coronavirus & Force
Majeure: A Critical Study, 51 J. MAR. L. & COM. 51, 62–63 (2020) (arguing that gov-
ernment-mandated closures after the pandemic outbreak elevate the COVID-19
virus to a force majeure event); Russell Lewis et al., COVID-19: Force Majeure to the
Rescue?, 56 TENN. B.J. 20, 21 (2020) (emphasizing excusal of contract breaches due
to the COVID-19 pandemic vary depending on court’s interpretation of force
majeure clause language and effect of COVID-19 on the parties).
16. Consider, for example, the paradoxical effect of including a catchall
phrase in a force majeure clause.  When a force majeure clause includes a catchall
phrase, a court would likely to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis.  P.J.M.
Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of
Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COM. 213, 234 (1995).  For a discussion of this
limiting effect on relief afforded by a force majeure clause, see infra notes 110–17
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of holdings in contract disputes from early days of the
COVID-19 pandemic, see infra notes 130–48 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the notice requirements and other necessary elements
to successful invoke force majeure, see infra notes 44–57 and accompanying text.
19. For further development of this argument, see infra notes 155–58 and
accompanying text (compelling practitioners to scrap the force majeure clause for
most contracts).
20. See infra notes 149–94.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 195–207.
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been narrowly enforced.  In addition, Part I examines three common law
excuses for contract nonperformance that are available when parties do
not include a force majeure clause: impossibility, frustration of purpose,
and commercial practicality.  Part II provides a narrative analysis of how
legal communities around the country have decided force majeure cases
in the wake of previous global crises and in ongoing contract disputes in-
voking force majeure clauses related to COVID-19.  Part III provides a crit-
ical analysis of force majeure invocation in the aftermath of COVID-19
and other global crises and posits that force majeure clauses are frequently
ineffective and inefficient contractual additions that should be drafted
and invoked with great caution.  Finally, Part IV offers a hypothesis of what
to expect next for force majeure clauses, as well as a brief statement re-
garding the ongoing impact of force majeure litigation.
I. BUILDING THE FOUNDATION: HISTORY OF THE FORCE MAJEURE
DOCTRINE
A force majeure claim is equivalent to an affirmative defense invoked
when unforeseeable circumstances prevent one party from fulfilling its
contractual duties.23  There are typical elements of a force majeure clause,
but clauses vary greatly in scope and specificity, and state laws and courts
nationally and internationally differ somewhat in interpreting them.24  In
addition to force majeure, parties can invoke three common law doctrines
as affirmative defenses for nonperformance.25  Because contract liability is
strict liability, these common law excuses, as well as a force majeure de-
fense, are narrowly enforced by courts and should be successful only in
extreme and unusual circumstances.26
23. See Satter, supra note 15 (reporting that force majeure is “not easy to
invoke”).
24. See THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND
BUSINESS PRACTICES § 9:61 (3d ed. 2020) (introducing triggering event, necessary
effect, effect on contractual obligation, and notice requirement as the four typical
elements of a force majeure clause); see also Robert L. Gegios & Lance Duroni, The
Legal Domino Effect: COVID-19 & Contracts, 93 WIS. LAW. 12, 13 (2020) (advising that
businesses may need to consider the laws of other jurisdictions based on which law
controls the contract because of differences in interpretation across states and
countries).
25. For a discussion of the three common law doctrines that can be invoked
as affirmative defenses in cases of nonperformance, see infra notes 65–104 and
accompanying text (detailing the impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of
purpose doctrines).
26. See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 370 (2019) (declaring that a force majeure clause
“applies to objective events which directly affect the parties’ ability to perform[,]”
and that “subjective impossibility of performing does not relieve a party from the
contract unless the contract so states”).
5
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A. History of the Force Majeure Clause
The concept of force majeure has a longstanding history, dating back
to at least Roman times.27  It was adopted into French civil law during the
Napoleonic years.28  The English law concept of force majeure developed
out of the common law doctrine of impossibility, and has evolved over
time.29  Today, the force majeure doctrine exists in civil law countries, like
France, Greece, and Germany, as well as common law countries, like the
United States and United Kingdom.30  In the United States, some states
have even passed legislation that applies force majeure to certain
contracts.31
Ideally, a force majeure clause serves a different purpose in the con-
tract than the common law excuses for nonperformance, but in practice it
can “overlap” with all, some, or none of them.32  Force majeure clauses in
contracts “supersede” common law excuses.33  In other words, when par-
ties choose to include a force majeure clause in their contract, courts will
look to the force majeure clause before considering any of the common
law excuses in cases of nonperformance.34
B. The Purpose of the Force Majeure Doctrine
Force majeure clauses are intended to help parties avoid liability and
potential costly litigation by spelling out explicit events in which perform-
ance would be excused.35  By anticipating future events, parties should be
27. See SIMON HENTREI & XIMENA SOLEY, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151–54 (2011) (noting the similarities between the Roman
law concept ad impossibilia nemo tenetur, meaning “no one is expected to perform
the impossible[,]” and the modern concept of force majeure); see also Myanna Del-
linger, Rethinking Force Majeure in Public International Law, 37 PACE L. REV. 455, 458
(2017) (citing Federica I. Paddeu, A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International Law,
82 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 381, 385 (2012)).
28. See J. Denson Smith, Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse in French Law:
The Doctrine of Force Majeure, 45 YALE L.J. 452, 452 (1936) (citing 24 C. DEMOLOMBE,
COURS DE CODE NAPOLÉON, no. 553 (1877)).
29. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 214 (defining force majeure “as a contrac-
tual synonym for the general common law doctrine of . . . impossibility”).
30. See Jocelyn L. Knoll & Shannon L. Bjorklund, Force Majeure and Climate
Change: What is the New Normal?, 8 AM. C. CONSTR. L.J. 29, 31–33 (2014) (noting the
robust history of the force majeure doctrine and its application across the globe).
31. See id. at 38–39 (explaining which states have identified force majeure
events in their statutes).
32. See id. at 32–33 (noting the potential for a force majeure event to “over-
lap” with the common law doctrines of impossibility, frustration of purpose, or
commercial impracticability—or none of them at all).
33. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp.
850, 855 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that force majeure clauses “supersede” the com-
mon law doctrine of impossibility).
34. See id.
35. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 213 (listing the purpose of the force
majeure doctrine).  Along with other “excuse” doctrines, force majeure clauses
“play an important role in protecting contracting parties” by “excusing perform-
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able to avoid litigating whether a specific event should suspend or excuse
performance.36  Ideally, force majeure clauses provide greater certainty
and understanding between contracting parties.37
Today, force majeure clauses are used in contracts all over the world
to define circumstances that would excuse contractual obligations under a
contract.38  In fact, force majeure clauses have become so common in bus-
iness contracts that the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) devel-
oped a model force majeure clause in 1985.39  However, force majeure
clauses only provide an excuse for nonperformance of contractual obliga-
tions in extreme and unusual circumstances.40
C. Scaffolding: Elements of a Force Majeure Clause
A well-drafted force majeure clause “detail[s] the triggering events
and the necessary effects of these events on performance itself and on the
broader contractual obligations of both parties, while also providing a pro-
cedure for notification of a force majeure event.”41  The four elements
that should be included in a force majeure clause, and which must be
demonstrated for a party to successfully invoke force majeure, are “(1)
triggering events; (2) necessary effect of the triggering event on perform-
ance; (3) effect on contractual obligations; and (4) a notice require-
ance under a contract.”  Marel Katsivela, Contracts: Force Majeure Concept or Force
Majeure Clauses?, 12 UNIFORM L. REV. 101, 101 (2007).
36. See VIRGINIA FORMS § 3.01 (2020) (summarizing the purpose of a force
majeure clause and the ways the doctrine is meant to prevent additional litigation
between parties).
37. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 213–14 (offering a list of questions that a
force majeure clause should address).  “What happens when the circumstances on
which a contract was concluded change dramatically during the life-span of the
contract? Who bears the risk of these changes? How can parties deal with such a
situation in a contract?” Id.
38. See Jennifer Sniffen, In the Wake of the Storm: Nonperformance of Contract Obli-
gations Resulting from a Natural Disaster, 31 NOVA L. REV. 551, 554 (2007).
39. See General Considerations: Force Majeure Clauses in Commercial Contracts,
INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/
2020-forcemajeure-commcontracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML4P-PKM6 ] (last vis-
ited Aug. 14, 2020) (describing current ICC model force majeure clause); Introduc-
tory Note and Commentary: ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses 2020, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/07/icc-
forcemajeure-introductory-note.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6A9-ZY7Y ] (last visited
May 19, 2021) (describing history of the model force majeure and hardship clauses
from 1985 to 2020).
40. See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 370 (2019) (“A force majeure clause applies to objec-
tive events which directly affect the parties’ ability to perform; subjective impossi-
bility of performing does not relieve a party from the contract unless the contract
so states.”).
41. Selz et al., supra note 24, § 9.60 (listing four elements of a viable force
majeure clause).
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ment.”42  The “types of events that constitute force majeure depend on the
specific language included in the clause itself.”43  Historically, a force
majeure event was synonymous with an extraordinary natural disaster, or
an “act of God.”44  But in modern use, the clause encompasses “acts of
God” (such as volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and floods, and other natu-
ral disasters), as well as man-made and man-caused events (such as terror-
ist attacks, computer hacking, market shifts, and labor strikes).45
Most force majeure clauses contain a list of specific events that would
excuse a party’s nonperformance, along with a general “catchall provi-
sion.”46  Events that are often listed as force majeure events include
weather-related events, economic crises, governmental actions, breaks in
supply sources, and strikes.47  Usually, a generic or catchall phrase like
“and other events beyond the reasonable control of the parties” will end
the list of events in a force majeure clause.48  A catchall provision in a
force majeure clause is limited to things of the same kind and nature as
the specific events listed in the clause.49
42. Id. (recommending parts of a force majeure clause that should be in-
cluded in a contract); see also Declercq, supra note 16, at 230 (detailing four steps
of analyzing a force majeure clause).
43. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2020) (describing the im-
portance of the exact language of the force majeure contract, and the contract in
general).
44. See Sniffen, supra note 38, at 555 (“An act of God excuses events beyond
the control of mere human agency and occurs when there is an intervention of an
‘extraordinary, violent, and destructive agent,’. . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Finlay, 185 So. 904, 905 (Ala. 1939))); see also Selz et al.,
supra note 24, § 9.60; Act of God, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defin-
ing “act of God” as “[a]n overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by
forces of nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado” and noting that “[t]he
definition has been statutorily broadened to include all natural phenomena . . .
which could not be prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight.”).
45. See Selz et al., supra note 24, § 9:60 (describing progression of courts’ con-
strual of force majeure); see also Knoll & Bjorklund, supra note 30, at 33 (providing
examples to illustrate the broad range of circumstances in which force majeure
operates, including tort liability, noncompliance with applicable laws, and nonper-
formance of a contract); Sniffen, supra note 38, at 555 (noting that courts “have
also recognized that force majeure is a more expansive concept” than an act of
God).
46. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 232 (noting the commonality of a catchall
provision).  An example of a catchall provision would be “‘other similar causes
beyond the control’ of the parties.”  Morgantown Crossing, L.P. v. Mfrs. & Traders
Tr. Co., No. 03-CV-4707, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22949, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10,
2004) (emphasis omitted).
47. See generally Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure
Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91, 106–11 (2007) (detailing myriad scena-
rios that could lead parties to invoke force majeure).
48. Id. at 98.
49. This approach reflects the doctrine of ejusdem generis.  For a discussion on
this doctrine and its effect on interpreting force majeure clauses, see infra notes
114–17 and accompanying text.
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A force majeure clause should also detail the necessary “effect the trig-
gering event must have on performance.”50  Specifically, the force
majeure clause should indicate whether the party could be excused only if
performance became physically impossible, or if a party could be excused
if performance were merely impractical.51  Nonperformance caused by ec-
onomic hardship is not enough to fall within a force majeure provision.52
Even if a contract would involve greater expense than the parties antici-
pated at the time of drafting, increased expense alone is not a great
enough effect to excuse performance.53
Third, a force majeure clause should detail whether the contract will
be fully terminated or merely suspended or modified in response to a trig-
gering event.54  The clearest force majeure clauses will indicate an appro-
priate window of time after an event during which a party could invoke
force majeure, so when a party chooses to invoke the force majeure clause,
they can more clearly demonstrate compliance with the actual terms of
their contract.55  Finally, a well-drafted force majeure clause typically has a
notice requirement with which the parties must comply when invoking
force majeure.56  For example, the force majeure clause may require that
the party provides notice of the force majeure event to a specific individ-
ual, within a specific amount of time after the event occurs.57
50. Seltz et al., supra note 24, § 9:63 (emphasis added) (noting a “force
majeure provision should specifically discuss what effect the triggering event must
have on performance.”).
51. See id.
52. See Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 458 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court’s holding that unseasonably hot temperatures
and the subsequent record demand for power and high hourly prices for electric
power did not excuse defendant’s inability to deliver power required under the
contract’s force majeure clause).
53. See OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214,
1215, 1223–25 (D. Haw. 2003) (holding that parties were bound by their contract
for a conference event in Hawaii in February 2002, even though terrorist attacks
on 9/11 made travel less appealing and less lucrative).
54. See Selz et al., supra note 24, § 9:63 (listing provisions parties should in-
clude to address the necessary effect of a force majeure event in a force majeure
clause).
55. See, e.g., OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (declaring that excusing
performance under a force majeure “ad infinitum” after a terrorist attack would
“render contracts meaningless in the present age” because terrorism could pose a
threat “for the foreseeable future”); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Bumgarner, 197
Cal. App. 2d 331, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (highlighting the eight-week limit on
suspension due to a force majeure event before the contract could be terminated).
56. See Sean M. McChristian, Force Majeure: Hurricane Harvey Made Performance
Impossible—Now What?, 81 TEX. B.J. 236, 236 (2018) (noting the notice require-
ments are a “condition precedent” to invoking a force majeure clause).
57. See id.
9
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D. Process of Invoking Force Majeure and Using Unforeseeability as a Gap
Filler
A party can invoke a force majeure clause when an event stipulated in
the contract does in fact occur, then in fact prevents performance.58  A
party that wishes to invoke the force majeure as a defense for nonperform-
ance must be prepared to establish all four elements of the force majeure
clause.59  In addition to proving these four elements, a party that invokes
force majeure must also prove they were not negligent and—often—that
the force majeure event was not foreseeable.60  This is particularly true when
a party relies on a catchall provision, rather than a specifically enumerated
event, to invoke force majeure.61  As the Texas Court of Appeals reasoned
in Sun Operating Limited Partnership v. Holt,62 when an alleged force
majeure event is not specifically listed and falls within the general terms of
the catchall provision, it is unclear whether a party actually contemplated
and voluntarily assumed the event as a risk.63  Therefore, the Sun Operating
court determined it is appropriate to use unforeseeability to ‘fill the gaps’
in a contract that has a force majeure clause and when the alleged force
majeure event is not specifically listed in the clause.64
E. If Not for Force Majeure: Three Common Law Excuses for Nonperformance
In the absence of a force majeure clause in a contract, parties may
invoke default defenses for nonperformance, including the common law
excuses of physical impossibility, frustration of purpose, and commercial
impracticability.65  These excuses apply to contracts when a force majeure
clause has been left out of the contract and, although they are more com-
58. See Sniffen, supra note 38, at 554.
59. See id. at 554, 557 (describing how party endeavoring to call upon force
majeure provision has burden of proof of four elements).
60. See OWBR LLC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (defining negligence standard
that is applied to force majeure interpretation and noting that proving lack of
foreseeability was not required for the specific force majeure clause at issue); Sab-
ine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1170 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (defining
foreseeable standard that is applied to force majeure interpretation).
61. See Kelley, supra note 47, at 104 (describing a court’s approach to inter-
preting a catchall phrase when the catchall definition and a “beyond all reasonable
control” requirement followed a list of specified force majeure events).
62. 984 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App. 1998).
63. See id. at 290 (holding force majeure clause could not be invoked when
appellants could not prove that the force majeure event was the sole cause of
nonperformance).
64. See id. at 288 (“[B]efore any event can be successfully invoked as force
majeure by the . . . [p]arties, it must be outside their reasonable control.”).
65. See generally 7200 Scottsdale Rd. Gen. Partners v. Kuhn Farm Mach., Inc.,
909 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (demonstrating that other defenses, such as
impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose may be available when a
contract is silent as to a force majeure clause); see also Declercq, supra note 16, at
215.  Declercq notes that although these three doctrines have their own definitions
and legal standards, all three fit into the overall category of “contractual frustra-
tion.” Id. at 216.
10
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monly applied than the force majeure doctrine, they are narrowly applied
to excuse nonperformance.66  Unlike unforeseeability, which primarily
fills gaps within force majeure clauses, the common law doctrines of physi-
cal impossibility, frustration of purpose, and commercial impracticability
serve to primarily fill gaps in contracts when the event clearly falls outside
the scope of the force majeure clauses, or the contracts do not have a
force majeure clause at all.67
1. Physical Impossibility
Physical impossibility is a common law excuse with its roots in nine-
teenth-century English courts.68  Since it was first applied in Taylor v. Cald-
well,69 the doctrine of impossibility relied on physical destruction to make
performance impossible.70  Parties relying on defense of impossibility to
avoid liability for nonperformance must establish: “(1) the unexpected oc-
currence of intervening act, (2) such occurrence was of such a character
that its non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the agreement of the
parties, and (3) the occurrence made performance impracticable.”71
Common law courts have been slow to accept the doctrine of impossi-
bility as an argument for excuse from a contractual obligation.72  Al-
66. See, e.g., TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: FORCE MAJEURE AND
IMPOSSIBILITY COVID-19 § 2.01 (2020) [hereinafter Murray, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS] (“Courts have been reluctant to excuse promisors from their contractual
duties . . . . In general, the case law indicates the doctrines of impossibility, imprac-
ticability, or frustration of purpose only rarely succeed in excusing promisors’
duties.”).
67. See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Force
majeure clauses in contracts supersede the common law doctrine of impossibil-
ity.”).  These doctrines are also called “extra-contractual” bases to excuse nonper-
formance because they are applied to contracts even when they are not expressed
in the contract.  Murray, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 66, § 1.02 (2020); see
also Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and
the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 794 (2010).  “[A] primary
function of contract law is to establish ‘default’ or background terms that apply in
the absence of an express term on point . . . . But if the parties so desire . . . they
may vary from (contract around) any given default term, and courts will give effect
to their derogation.” Id.
68. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 216 (citing Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826,
32 L.J. Q.B. 164 (1863) and its departure from absolute liability in contracts).  In
Taylor v. Caldwell, the court determined that the parties were excused from per-
formance for an event contract when the event space, a music hall, was burned to
the ground a week before performances were scheduled to begin. See id.
69. 3 B. & S. 826.
70. See Selz et al., supra note 24, § 9:60 n.5 (noting that there is no “‘clear
precedent’ for the modern permutations of force majeure because most force
majeure clauses are limited to events that would make it either ‘illegal’ or ‘impossi-
ble’” (citation omitted)); see also Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296
(N.Y. 1987) (describing the impossibility doctrine).
71. Opera Co. of Bos., Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d
1094, 1102 (4th Cir. 1987).
72. See Mark B. Baker, “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall”—Terrorism and Excused
Contractual Performance in a Post September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 14 (2004)
11
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though the common law courts had treated parties arguing impossibility
harshly, they had allowed for three exceptions to the ruling that impossi-
bility will not excuse contractual obligations: (1)supervening illegality, (2)
death or disability, and (3) destruction.73  As with other defenses for non-
performance, physical impossibility is given a narrow scope and rarely ap-
plied because it “undermines the very nature of a contract as a legally
enforceable promise.”74
One scholar contemplated the applicability of the impossibility doc-
trine as a defense for nonperformance of a contract for childcare:
[I]f a babysitter promised to look after your children once a week
for $50, she is bound to the contract regardless of car trouble,
the kids misbehaving, or other hardships.  If the going gets tough
and the babysitter gives up, that is a breach of contract and she is
legally liable to you.  This is what makes her contract a contract,
and not an idle promise to give it a try.  But if the babysitter
failed to show up because the COVID-19 pandemic made it physi-
cally dangerous for her to enter your house, the [i]mpossibility
doctrine will come to her aid. Because the COVID-19 pandemic
is . . . so radically different from the ordinary risks and challenges
of babysitting, and because it makes her performance so much
more difficult and dangerous than expected, the law will excuse
her nonperformance pursuant to the doctrine of
[i]mpossibility.75
(explaining courts’ deference for the contract as complete and resistance to apply-
ing the doctrine of impossibility).
73. See Abbot of Westminster v. Clerke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59, 63 (K.B. 1536) (hold-
ing that a seller is excused from his contractual obligation to deliver wheat on a
given day in another country if the delivery is made statutorily illegal before the
delivery date).  Centuries later, the Supreme Court of the United States held that if
contractual performance is prohibited or made impossible by governmental au-
thority, a party may be excused from the contract.  Louisville & Nat’l R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 485–86 (1911) (holding that an agreement by the defen-
dant to issue free railroad passes for life to the plaintiff was excused when a law
that made it illegal took effect); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 263 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“If the existence of a specific thing is necessary for the
performance of a duty, its failure to come into existence, destruction, or such dete-
rioration as makes performance impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”); Baker, supra note
72, at 15 (noting that death can be grounds for discharge from a contract, except
when the breaching party could have delegating the contractual duty to another
person).
74. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 49–50 (citing Kel Kim Corp., 519 N.E.2d at 296).
In Kel Kim, the court observed that impossibility is rarely used as a defense because
of “judicial recognition that the purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that
might affect performance and that performance should be excused only in ex-
treme circumstances.” Id.
75. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 52 (illustrating how impossibility doctrine could
come into consideration for millions of families responding to the COVID-19 pan-
demic and related government shutdown orders).
12
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Early COVID-19 ligation shows that courts are willing to apply the im-
possibility doctrine to excuse nonperformance.76  In In re Cinemax USA
Real Estate Holdings, Inc.77, a Florida bankruptcy court determined that a
movie theater operator was not obligated to pay rent to its landlord while
government shutdown orders were in place due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic because it was “impossible for the movie theater to be opened.”78
Cases like Martorella v. Rapp79 have served as a warning to parties that
make their contracts overly complicated such that they contract around
the default excuse available through the impossibility doctrine.80  In
Martorella, Christopher Martorella purchased a property at a public auc-
tion.81  A closing date was set, and per the agreement, Martorella made an
initial deposit on the property.82  The agreement provided that if he failed
to fulfill his contractual obligations, he would lose the deposit as liqui-
dated damages.83  As the closing date neared, however, Martorella’s wife
ended up admitted to the hospital, battling for her life against the COVID-
19 virus.84  He claimed that her illness, and the pandemic in general,
made closing on the property on the scheduled date impossible.85  The
court rejected Martorella’s argument, though, because the agreement
specified that Martorella expressly assumed the risk of financing the full
purchase on the original closing date.86  The court acknowledged that the
result was “harsh,” but that the specific language of the contract itself left
no option for the court to apply the impossibility doctrine to excuse per-
formance.87  Essentially, Martorella leaves contracting parties with a choice:
76. See, e.g., In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., No. 20-14695-BKC-
LMI, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 200, at *1, 16 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021) (holding a movie
theater operator in the midst of bankruptcy is excused from paying rent for the
time government shutdown orders prevented the operator from conducting busi-
ness).  Early litigation based on contract interruptions due to COVID-19 seems to
indicate that courts will be most likely to consider the impossibility doctrine as an
excuse for nonperformance.  While very few briefs or cases filed before January
2021 contemplate the applicability of the frustration of purpose or impracticability
doctrine, several courts have already analyzed COVID-19 government shutdown
orders as impossibility defenses.
77. 2021 B.R. LEXIS 200.
78. Id. at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021) (emphasis added).
79. 28 LCR 306 (Mass. Land Ct. 2020).
80. See id. (holding that impossibility was not a defense available to a man who
was unable to finance a purchase after his wife became critically ill with COVID-19
virus in Massachusetts in April 2020).
81. Id. at 307 (describing purchase arrangement between Martorella and Stu-
art Rapp).
82. Id.  Martorella’s deposit was ten percent of the full purchase price. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 307–08 (detailing Martorella’s wife’s illness timeline).
85. Id. at 306 (summarizing Martorella’s legal argument for applying the doc-
trine of impossibility).
86. Id. at 310 (acknowledging financing arrangements in the agreement as
“undisputed”).
87. Id. at 311.
13
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attempt to formulate a highly detailed force majeure clause that might
include “pandemic” as an enumerated force majeure event and potentially
exclude the availability of the impossibility doctrine, or formulate a much
simpler force majeure clause that would not protect the parties in a pan-
demic but would leave the opportunity open for a court to apply the im-
possibility doctrine.88
In other cases, like Lantino v. Clay LLC,89 courts have denied consid-
ering the impossibility doctrine altogether, emphasizing that it should be
narrowly applied.90  In Lantino, the defendants tried to raise the impossi-
bility doctrine to excuse defaulting on a settlement payment arranged in a
previous dispute.91  In response to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, the defendants argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and the
New York executive orders to shut down businesses in April 2020 made it
economically impossible to keep up with settlement payments.92  The
court rejected the defendants’ defense and granted summary judgment,
explaining that “where impossibility or difficulty of performance is occa-
sioned only by financial difficulty or economic hardship, even to the ex-
tent of insolvency or bankruptcy, performance of a contract is not
excused.”93
2. Frustration of Purpose
“Frustration of purpose” evolved as a defense in order to excuse a
party from performance under a contract when an intervening or super-
vening condition substantially frustrated the main purpose for the con-
tract.94  For the doctrine of frustration of purpose to apply, the parties, in
making a contract, must have been operating under a basic assumption
that the intervening or supervening event would not occur.95  The frustra-
88. For further discussion of Martorella, see supra notes 79–87 and accompany-
ing text.
89. No. 1:18-cv-12247 (SDA), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81474 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
90. Id. at *7 (analyzing New York’s impossibility standards).
91. Id. at *4–6 (summarizing previous dispute and settlement agreement).
92. Id. at *6 (reporting defendants’ argument for applying the impossibility
doctrine to their case).
93. Id. at *7 (quoting 407 E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23
N.Y.2d 275, 281 (1968)).
94. See Tri-Town Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commerce Park Assocs. 12, LLC, 139
A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2016) (explaining that frustration of purpose doctrine excuses
a party from performance “on the occurrence of an intervening or supervening
condition that substantially frustrates the main purpose for which the parties en-
tered into the contract in the first place”).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst.
1981).  The Restatement further notes, for the doctrine of frustration of purpose
to apply, “the purpose that is frustrated must have been a principal purpose of that
party in making the contract” and “[i]t is not enough that he had in mind some
specific object without which he would not have made the contract. The object
must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understand,
without it the transaction would make little sense.” Id.
14
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tion of purpose defense has three elements: (1) “the event giving rise to
claim must be totally unexpected and unforeseeable;” (2) “the risk of the
event must not be provided for, either by the language of the charter party
or by custom;” and (3) “the performance of the contract must be impossi-
ble or commercially impracticable.”96  “Frustration may be complete or
partial.”97  But when only part of a performance is frustrated, it’s less likely
that a court will excuse nonperformance.98
As with other defenses for nonperformance, frustration of purpose is
applied narrowly.99  A Florida bankruptcy court considered COVID-19 as
frustration of purpose along with the impossibility doctrine in In re
Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc.100  Even though the court did find
that the government shutdown provided the movie theater operator with
an impossibility defense for nonpayment of the lease, the court declined
to apply frustration of purpose for missed lease payments after the
mandatory shutdown ceased because the movie theater opted to stay
closed for economic reasons.101
3. Impracticability
The doctrine of commercial impracticability is the newest of the three
common law excuses for contract nonperformance.102  A party can invoke
96. Hilton Oil Transp. v. Oil Transp. Co., S.A., 659 So. 2d 1141, 1147 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995)  (citation omitted) (presenting the three elements of the doc-
trine of frustration of purpose).
97. Murray, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 66, § 5.06.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., IMAX Corp. v. Capital Ctr., 156 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576 (M.D. Pa.
2016) (“The doctrine of frustration of purpose is to be applied sparingly.”); Gan-
der Mountain Co. v. Islip U-Slip LLC, 923 F. Supp. 2d 351, 359 (N.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“The doctrine of frustration of purpose is ‘a narrow one which does not apply
unless the frustration is substantial.’”); see also Tri-Town Constr. Co., Inc., 139 A.3d at
475 (R.I. 2016) (reiterating that “frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to
be regarded as within the risks that [the parties] assumed under the contract”).
100. No. 20-14695-BKC-LMI, 2021 B.R. LEXIS 200, at *14 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2021) (distinguishing impossibility excuse for nonperformance from frustration of
purpose excuse and applying them to the case).
101. Id. at *14–16.
There is no question that the COVID-19 pandemic was completely un-
foreseeable (although a slow down in audience attendance or a dearth of
new releases is not), and certainly not the fault of either contract party.
But, once the Lakeside Theater was allowed to reopen, it was possible for
CB Theater to reopen; CB Theater chose not to do so for what appears
. . . to be primarily economic concerns. Therefore CB Theater’s perform-
ance under the Lakeside Lease from June 5, 2020 on is not excused
under the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
Id. at *14.
102. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 217 (citing Mineral Park Land Co. v. How-
ard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916)). Mineral Park involved a construction contract dispute
and was the first case to apply commercial impracticability as an excuse for nonper-
formance. Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. 458.  In that case, the court held that “[a]
thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.” Id.
15
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an impracticability defense if some event does happen and renders the
performance impracticable.103  Courts have held that a contract becomes
impracticable when its performance becomes excessively and unreasona-
bly difficult or expensive.104
F. Standard Approach to Interpreting the Force Majeure Doctrine
When a contract dispute arises, a court will look to the terms of the
contract first, and then consider common law defenses for nonperform-
ance.105  Thus, when a contract includes a force majeure clause, it is con-
sidered first.106  Force majeure clauses vary from contract to contract, so
courts must interpret them when parties dispute nonperformance.107
Courts interpret force majeure clauses based on the specific language
used in the contract.108  The court’s objective is to determine the intent of
at 460 (quoting 1 BEACH ON CONTRACTS § 216).  The U.C.C. codified the common
law doctrine of impracticability much later, in 1977. See Declercq, supra note 16, at
217 (noting three conditions that must be present to excuse a seller from perform-
ance under the U.C.C.).  The three conditions are: (1) a contingency must occur;
(2) performance must thereby be made “impracticable;” and (3) the nonoccur-
rence of a contingency must have been the “basic assumption” on which the con-
tract was made. Id. at 218.  A party asserting an impracticability defense has the
burden of proof on all three of these requirements. Id.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that perform-
ance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.”).
104. See CITI Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Taylor, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18171,
*9–10 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[T]he impracticability defense largely pertains to the
performance of a physical act.”); see also Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14305, *5 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (finding that a loss of $5.8 million
did not render contract impracticable or excuse performance under the force
majeure clause because “[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance un-
less the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essen-
tial nature of the performance”).
105. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 226 (describing courts’ approach to inter-
preting contractual language when contracts include force majeure clauses).
106. See In re Hitz Rest. Group, 616 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020)
(“Force majeure clauses in contracts supersede common law doctrine of
impossibility.”).
107. See Entzel v. Moritz Sport and Marine, 841 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 2014)
(detailing the importance of the specific language of the contract to a court’s in-
terpretation of the contract).
108. See id. (“What types of events constitute force majeure depend on the
specific language included in the clause itself.  [N]ot every force majeure event
need be beyond the parties’ reasonable control to still qualify as an excuse.” (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 43, § 77.31)); see
also Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998)
(“[W]hen the parties have themselves defined the contours of force majeure in
their agreement, those contours dictate the application, effect, and scope of force
majeure” with regard to that agreement and those parties, and reviewing courts
are “not at liberty to rewrite the contract or interpret it in a manner which the
parties never intended”).
16
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the parties at the time the contract was made, based on the language used
in the contract.109
Courts have historically interpreted force majeure clauses extremely
narrowly; courts frequently reject claims of force majeure and rarely hold
that a party should be excused from a contract on this basis.110  If the
force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents
performance, then performance will be excused.111  When a clause lists
specific events that would excuse nonperformance, then courts will excuse
only the events that are specified.112  If a clause is worded more broadly or
includes a catchall phrase, courts will look to the rest of the contract to
determine the scope of the force majeure clause, and will apply greater
scrutiny to alleged force majeure events that are not specifically listed.113
Following the doctrine of ejusdem generis, “general words are not given an
expansive meaning; they are confined to things of the same kind or nature
as the particular matters mentioned in the non-exhaustive list.”114  The
principle of ejusdem generis prevented a nonperformance defense in Kyocera
Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC.115  Even though the contract in Ky-
109. See Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 25
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (describing the goals of contract interpretation).
110. See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that a lessee’s inability to procure and maintain liability coverage that was
required under the lease would not be excused under the contractual force
majeure clause because the clause did it was not specifically listed in the clause and
did not fall within the clause’s catchall phrase).
111. See id. at 296 (noting the narrow defense provided by force majeure
clauses).
112. See Sniffen, supra note 38, at 559 (citing Kel Kim Corp., 519 N.E.2d at
296).
113. See Kel Kim Corp., 519 N.E.2d at 297 (noting that the principle of inter-
pretation applied to catchall phrases “is that the general words are not to be given
expansive meaning; they are confined to things of the same kind or nature as the
particular matters mentioned” (citing 18 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1968, at 209
(3d. ed. 1978))); see also Declercq, supra note 16, at 234 (describing the doctrine of
ejusdem generis as a canon of interpretation of a catch-all provision, where general
words are not given an expansive meaning).  “If the drafter refrained from making
a list and chose to use only general language to define the force majeure events, it
is likely that courts will turn to the doctrine [of ejusdem generis].” Id.
114. Declercq, supra note 16, at 234 n.127 (describing the ejusdem generis doc-
trine as “a canon of construction which limits the application of general terms
which follow specific ones to matters similar in kind or character to those speci-
fied”).  Declercq notes that courts will usually narrowly interpret catch-all phrases
using the principle of ejusdem generis, and commented on how the expectations for
specificity in force majeure clauses is paradoxical: “If the function of a force
majeure clause is to protect the parties against the unusual, how can courts then
not excuse performance because an excusing event is not specifically delineated in
the clause?  This judicial approach . . . seems to run contrary to the purpose of
force majeure clauses.” Id. at 234 (footnote omitted).
115. 886 N.W.2d 445, 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e hold that the con-
duct alleged in this case did not constitute a force-majeure event under the parties’
contract, and that the trial court should have, had it considered the issue, granted
summary disposition to defendant on that additional ground.”).
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ocera contained a force majeure clause that included “acts of the govern-
ment,” the court determined that no force majeure event had occurred
when a “trade war” between the United States and China resulted in dra-
matic price fluctuation for solar panel parts.116  After considering the con-
tract as a whole, the court concluded that that honoring the force majeure
event would “nullify a central term” of the contract.117
Beyond the list of force majeure events, courts are also sensitive to
other particularities in a force majeure clause that could prevent it from
being fully successfully invoked.  For example, in Aquila, Inc. v. C.W. Min-
ing,118 the court held that because the mining company failed to give writ-
ten notice as required by the contract, the force majeure event did not
excuse the mining company’s performance.119
II. DETERIORATING STRUCTURES: FORCE MAJEURE CRUMBLES IN CASES
AFTER MODERN GLOBAL CRISES
Recently, the legal world, with many spectators, has been busy analyz-
ing whether COVID-19 is a force majeure event.120  Even prior to COVID-
19, contemporary global crises were sparking debate over what should be
included in a force majeure clause and which types of crises should be
considered force majeure events.121  Jurisprudence around force majeure
invocation in response to each of these crises demonstrate how courts fre-
quently rely on standards from the common law doctrines of impossibility,
frustration of purpose, and impracticability to deal with the difficult dis-
ruptions to contractual performance when force majeure provisions do
not exist.122
116. Id. at 448–49 (quoting the terms of the contract).
117. Id. at 453 (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799
F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also TEC Olmos, LLC v. Conocophillips Co., 555
S.W.3d 176, 185–86 (Tex. App. 2018) (holding general catchall phrase must be
limited to the types of events specifically listed); Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v.
Kinder Morgan Operating LP “C”, No. 2:16-cv-00345-SGC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115394 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (applying ejusdem generis to limit force majeure events to the
kinds of matters specifically listed in the force majeure clause), aff’d, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4841 (11th Cir. 2021).
118. 545 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 1266.
120. See generally Satter, supra note 15 (noting surge in discussions among le-
gal scholars and practitioners regarding force majeure).
121. See, e.g., Patrick J. O’Connor, Allocating Risks of Terrorism and Pandemic
Pestilence: Force Majeure for an Unfriendly World, 23 CONSTR. L. 5, 5–6 (2003) (con-
templating whether global crisis like terrorist events or pandemics are force
majeure events).
122. See Jeremiah A. Ho, Why Flexibility Matters: Inequality and Contract Plural-
ism, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35, 82 (2017) (citing Kelley, supra note 47, at 93)
(describing the role that the common law defenses play as gap fillers for ambigu-
ous force majeure clauses).
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A. Pre-COVID-19: Crises and Pandemic Predictions
Scholars postulated that an imminent pandemic would wreak havoc
on global business transactions more than a decade before anyone had
even heard of COVID-19.123  Plus, previous global crises like terrorist
events, hurricanes, and other natural disasters quickly triggered litigation
over force majeure coverage in the past decades.124  Although scholars’
precise predictions around the timing and cellular make-up of the even-
tual pandemic virus varied, scholars generally agreed that the business
would be dramatically affected by a pandemic in the near future.125
Unfortunately, despite the robust canon of pandemic predictions, the
term “pandemic” is glaringly absent from pre-COVID-19 contracts.126
Even the more general term “epidemic” is hardly included in force
majeure clauses drafted before COVID-19.127  Some scholars point to this,
along with the utter lack of pre-2020 caselaw examining force majeure
invocation in pandemics, as evidence to be skeptical that force majeure
123. See, e.g., Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb, 91 A.B.A. J. 36 (2005)
(making the case for the legal community to think through the business implica-
tions of an inevitable pandemic related to the avian flu); Jodi Fedor, Riots!
Pandemics! Active Shooters! Thinking About the Unthinkable when Negotiating Real Estate
Documents, 33 No. 2 PRAC. REAL EST. L. 5 (2017) (encouraging landlords to
thoughtfully consider how a potential pandemic would affect real estate docu-
ments); Joseph Nicosia III, Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of Preparing for Global Pan-
demic, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 479 (2006) (suggesting preemptive legislative
efforts in the United States to help the country prepare for an inevitable pandemic
in the 21st century); O’Connor, supra note 121 (predicting that an imminent
global pandemic would bring about volatility and far-reaching economic devasta-
tion in a similar way to terrorist events on and after 9/11).
124. For example, a conference group attempted to invoke force majeure to
excuse them from paying for a resort reservation in Maui more than five months
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266
F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216–17 (D. Haw. 2003).  The court held that the terrorist at-
tacks could not be invoked as a force majeure event to excuse performance of a
resort hotel reservations in Maui “when there was no specific terrorist threat to air
travel to Maui or to Maui itself. . . .” Id. at 1224.  In another case, a New Jersey
warehouse company attempted to invoke force majeure after Hurricane Sandy ob-
literated the New Jersey coast.  TGI Office Automation v. Nat’l Elec. Transit Corp.,
No. 13-CV-3404 (ARR) (VMS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189880 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
The court held that Hurricane Sandy was undisputedly a force majeure event, but
that force majeure could not be successfully invoked as a defense because the
clause was general and therefore required a foreseeability test—which it failed. Id.
at *22.  In yet another case, the Minnesota district court dismissed a power plant
owner’s claim that the 2008 financial crisis was a force majeure event.  Great Lakes
Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1021
(D. Minn. 2015).
125. For examples of the pre-COVID-19 scholarship on pandemic predic-
tions, see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 56.  In April 2020, Schwartz conducted a
search of Westlaw’s “All State & Federal” database which revealed that none of the
cases in the database mentioned force majeure with the term “pandemic.” Id.
127. See id. at 56–57 (noting that a search in Westlaw in April 2020 revealed
only seventy-four cases out of more than 2,000 force majeure cases where the word
“epidemic” appeared).
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can be invoked at all to excuse nonperformance for contracts that were
interrupted by the pandemic.128  However, early COVID-19 litigation indi-
cates an overwhelming willingness to classify COVID-19 as a force majeure
event.129
1. Early COVID-19 Cases
Early COVID-19 litigation has shown that getting courts to recognize
COVID-19 as a force majeure event is the smallest hurdle; most parties have
been able to get courts to classify interruptions due to the pandemic as
force majeure events but are unable to successfully invoke force majeure
as a defense because they have been unable to connect the “event” to actu-
ally causing nonperformance.130  For example, in Palm Spring Mile Associ-
ates v. Kirkland’s Stores, Inc.,131 a commercial real estate company sued
Kirkland’s Stores for breach of a commercial lease when the retail com-
pany failed to pay rent beginning in April 2020.132  Kirkland’s then moved
to dismiss, arguing that its obligation to pay rent was relieved by the force
majeure provision in the lease, which was triggered by COVID-19-related
government shutdowns and restrictions.133  The court readily found that
COVID-19 was a force majeure event, but it firmly rejected Kirkland’s ar-
gument because the restrictions related to COVID-19 did not “directly af-
fect Kirkland’s ability to pay rent.”134
128. See Lewis et al., supra note 15, at 21 (“Despite the history of the Spanish
Flu, we could find no reported cases from any U.S. jurisdiction that addressed
force majeure in the context of an epidemic, pandemic or disease outbreak in the
human population.”); see also Gegios & Duroni, supra note 24, at 14 (“No cookie-
cutter answer suffices as to whether the COVID-19 outbreak has created an event
of force majeure.  Obviously, if a force majeure clause lists ‘epidemic’ or ‘pan-
demic,’ coverage is far more likely than if the most relevant included language is
‘act of God’ or a general catch-all phrase.”).
129. For a discussion of several cases in which courts have determined that
COVID-19 qualifies as a force majeure event, see infra notes 130–45 and accompa-
nying text.
130. See, e.g., Palm Springs Mile Assocs. v. Kirkland’s Stores, Inc., No. 20-
21724-Civ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163880 (S.D. Fla. 2020).  For a further discussion
of the court’s reasoning in this case, see infra notes 131–34 and accompanying
text.
131. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163880.
132. Id. at *1 (describing contract nonperformance issue at the center of con-
tract litigation).
133. The force majeure clause in the agreement between Palm Spring Mile
Associates and Kirkland’s read as follows:
Whenever a period of time is prescribed in this Lease for action to be
taken by either party, such party will not be liable or responsible for, and
there will be excluded from the computation of any such period of time,
any delays due to strikes, riots, acts of God, shortages of labor or materi-
als, war, governmental laws, regulations or restrictions or any other causes
of any kind whatsoever which are beyond the reasonable control of such
party.
Id. at *4-5.
134. Id. at *5 (citing ARHC NVWELFL01, LLC. v. Chatsworth At Wellington
Green, LLC., No. 18-80712, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19264, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2019)).
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Similarly, the federal district court in Hawaii found that COVID-19 is
undeniably a force majeure event, but dismissed the case before the par-
ties could even litigate whether the force majeure doctrine excused non-
performance in NetOne, Inc. v. Panache Destination Management.135  In that
case, NetOne, a travel company, planned to sponsor an event for 500 peo-
ple in Hawaii in late March 2020.136  Panache agreed to provide services
for the event, and NetOne made deposits of over $150,000 to Panache in
preparation for their services.137  But after the deposits had been made
and before the event, the CDC recommended events for fifty or more peo-
ple be canceled or postponed and the Hawaii governor instructed every-
one on the island to heed the public health guidance.138  NetOne
canceled the event, but Panache refused to return its deposit.139  NetOne
sued Panache, arguing that refusing to return the deposit violated the
force majeure clause in their agreement.140  Ultimately, the court dis-
missed the case because, even though COVID-19 may be a force majeure
event, forcing Panache to return the deposit would make the court “effec-
tively re-write the parties contracts to include language that could have
been (but was not) used.”141
Furthermore, courts have explicitly recognized that force majeure
clauses have eliminated the option of relying on extra-contractual, default
common law excuses for nonperformance for parties in the wake of
COVID-19.  In In re CEC Entertainment, Inc.,142 the company that operates a
nationwide chain of Chuck E. Cheese venues tried to invoke force majeure
and frustration of purpose to excuse lease payments in three different
states when state-specific executive orders forced the operator to cease op-
135. No. 20-cv-00150-DKW-WRP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201129, at *1 (D.
Haw. 2020) (introducing facts and outcome of the case).
136. Id. at *3–4.
137. Id. at *4–5.
138. Id. at *5.
139. Id. at *6–7.
140. The force majeure clause in the contract between NetOne and Panache
said:
The pricing contained within this document and the performance of this
agreement by either party is subject to acts of God, war, governmental
regulation, disaster, or other casualty, strikes or threat of strikes (excep-
tion: neither party may terminate this agreement for strikes or labor dis-
putes involving their own employees or agents)[,] acts and/or threats of
terrorism, or curtailment of transportation services or similar cause be-
yond the control of either party making it illegal, impossible, or commer-
cially impracticable to hold the meeting/convention/function or provide
the facility. Either party may terminate or suspend its obligations under
this agreement by written notice to the other party if such obligations are
delayed or prevented by any of the above events to the extent such events
are beyond the reasonable control of the party whose reasonable per-
formance is prevented or frustrated.
Id. at *6–7.
141. Id. at *9.
142. 625 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
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erations for months.143  After the court determined that the force majeure
clause did not excuse nonperformance of the lease agreement, the com-
pany operator argued that “because the leases do not specifically contem-
plate a pandemic [in the force majeure clauses], the force majeure clauses
do not supersede frustration [of purpose]” as an excuse for nonperform-
ance in the lease payments.144  In all leases across all three states, the court
found that the force majeure clause supersedes the frustration of purpose
doctrine and prevented the operator from invoking frustration of purpose
as a defense for nonperformance.145
One exception to these cases, where force majeure was successfully
invoked to excuse performance, is In re Hitz Restaurant Group.146  In that
case, a restaurant argued that its obligation to pay rent was relieved by the
force majeure clause in its lease because of the Illinois state restrictions in
place during COVID-19.147  The court agreed, holding that the Illinois
stay-at-home order that prevented the restaurant from providing on-prem-
ises dining was a force majeure event that partially relieved the restaurant
from paying rent.148
143. Id. at *351 (summarizing Chuck E. Cheese operator’s argument).
144. Id. at *358.  Further, the operator argued that “a doctrine whose applica-
tion is predicated on the occurrence of unforeseen events can only be abrogated if
the parties foresee and contract around the specific event.” Id.  The In re CEC
Entm’t, Inc. court rejected this argument, stating plainly that this reasoning “is im-
possible.” Id.
145. Because of a choice of law provision in the leases, all three leases were
considered by the Texas bankruptcy court. Id. at *358–62.  When the Texas bank-
ruptcy court examined each lease and took into account the state laws controlling
each lease, the court arrived at the conclusion that the force majeure clause pre-
vented the operator from having the frustration of purpose excuse available in all
three leases. Id.  The court recognized that the force majeure clause in the North
Carolina lease specifically “contemplates unusual government regulations and how
they may alter the parties’ performance obligations[,]” and that the “parties specif-
ically agreed that unusual government regulations shall not relieve CEC’s obliga-
tion to pay rent.” Id. at *359–60.  Further, the North Carolina lease’s force
majeure clause “precludes CEC’s reliance on frustration” as a defense for nonper-
formance. Id. at *360.  Similarly, the court found that the force majeure clause
could not be invoked to excuse nonpayment of the lease in Washington state. Id. at
*361.  Further, as in North Carolina, CEC could not invoke frustration as a defense
for nonperformance in Washington because “payment of rent is excepted from
the force majeure clauses, which demonstrates that the parties assigned the risk of
paying rent during a force majeure event to CEC.  Washington does not allow a
party to assert frustration when the lease allocates the risk of frustration.” Id. (cit-
ing Scott v. Petett, 816 P.2d 1229, 1229 (Wash. App. 1991)).  Finally, regarding the
leases in California, the court wrote, “[t]he Cupertino and National City leases
supersede frustration of purpose under California law. Both of those leases excuse
most nonperformance caused by government regulations, but expressly require
rent payments notwithstanding frustrating regulations . . . . [t]he force majeure
clause of the Cupertino lease supersedes frustration[.]” Id. at 362.
146. 616 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020).
147. Id. at 376–77.
148. Id. at 377 (“The force majeure clause in this lease was unambiguously
triggered by . . . [Illinois] Governor Pritzker’s executive order” that suspended
restaurant service for two weeks in March 2020).  The court cited three reasons
22
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III. DEMOLITION TIME: FORCE MAJEURE USELESS IN A CRISIS
The force majeure doctrine has, in many ways, outgrown itself.149  As
organizations and their legal counsel rush to address any number of
global crises in their contacts through expanded force majeure provisions,
they move further away from limiting uncertainty—the very thing the
force majeure doctrine was designed to achieve.150  Instead of creating
greater efficiency and certainty, bumbling force majeure clauses create un-
certainty, leading to more up-front negotiation post hoc litigation.151
A. Practical Business Inefficiencies and Redundancy with Common Law
Defenses for Nonperformance
Updating a force majeure clause in response to COVID-19 could
cause unnecessary business expenses and holdups with no promise of any
actual relief or benefit.152  Practitioners should hesitate before blindly up-
dating force majeure clauses after global crises because of practical busi-
ness considerations and redundancy with common law excuses that would
otherwise be available.153  In most cases, the common law excuses provide
more relief than force majeure clauses in the wake of a global crisis like
the COVID-19 pandemic.154
1. Boilerplate Force Majeure Clauses are Not Helpful
When organizations rush to update force majeure clauses in the after-
math of a global crisis, they risk accumulating hefty legal fees and precious
negotiation time for little eventual pay off.155  Businesses that seek to add
“pandemic” to force majeure provisions may encounter challenges or
holdups with contract negotiation that would otherwise proceed
smoothly.156  Furthermore, invoking a force majeure clause could spoil a
why the governor’s executive order is a force majeure event covered by the parties’
force majeure clause. Id. at 377–78.
149. For a discussion of the ways force majeure has become unwieldy and
often ineffective, see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
150. See id.
151. For a discussion of the ways force majeure can lead to more litigation,
see infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
152. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 59–60 (differentiating the “legal perspec-
tive” from the “business perspective” in support of foregoing unnecessary contract
negotiations); see also Gegios & Duroni, supra note 24, at 14–15.
153. For a discussion of the ways force majeure can be redundant of the de-
fault common law defenses, see infra notes 170–94 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., In re CEC Entm’t, Inc., 625 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
For further discussion of the Texas bankruptcy court’s analysis of the leases and
the protections relinquished by the Chuck E. Cheese operator when the leases
included force majeure clauses, see supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
155. See Gegios & Duroni, supra note 24, at 14–15 (summarizing the negative
effects a business could risk by invoking force majeure).
156. See id.; see also Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual
Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 760 (2009) (“[A]n optimal contractual alloca-
tion of uncertainty does not always track the optimal allocation of risk.”).
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business relationship for little economic benefit.157  Even though invoking
force majeure to get out of some contractual obligations might bring
short-term relief, the potential harm to future business could cause great
long-term losses.158
For a force majeure clause to be useful, it must be specifically and
carefully tailored.159  But all too often, force majeure clauses are an after-
thought for parties that may be too busy to draft tailored clauses, too un-
realistic to foresee potentially problematic events, or too unsophisticated
or inexperienced to adjust boilerplate clauses to their actual needs.160  A
sloppy or hasty force majeure clause can pose huge risks to the parties of a
contract.161
Furthermore, there is an underlying assumption that adding specific
events to a force majeure clause will lead to more certain, efficient deter-
minations regarding whether performance is actually excused should that
event arise.162  The recent, highly public contract debates between the
NBA and players in its league, however, demonstrate just how little it really
matters that an event is specified in the force majeure clause.163  Unlike
157. See Gegios & Duroni, supra note 24, at 14–15.
158. See id. (noting that potential harm to a future business, including poten-
tial loss of a customer or supplier, may greatly exceed the relief that organizations
could experience when they invoke force majeure for minor contract issues).
159. See Peter Crofton & Erin Peterson, The Evolution of Force Majeure in Con-
struction Contracts, LAW360 (June 22, 2015), https://plus.lexis.com/api/
permalink/cd1ff2e5-d844-41a9-b634-1a6360db6e23/?context=153067 [https://
perma.cc/F8NM-ZERY] (highlighting the importance of careful drafting in order
to make use of force majeure as the “concise legal doctrine about what types of
events excuse performance” as it is intended (citing William Cary Wright, Force
Majeure Clauses and the Insurability of Force Majeure Risks, 23 CONST. LAW 16 (2003)));
see also Kelley, supra note 47, at 98 (emphasizing the importance of the amount of
detail included in the specific events constituting force majeure).
160. See Myanna Dellinger, An “Act of God”? Rethinking Contractual Impracticabil-
ity in an Era of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1563 (2017)
(noting variety of reasons parties would not make force majeure clauses sufficiently
tailored); Gary D. Way, Sudden Death: League Labor Disputes, Sports Licensing and Force
Majeure Neglect, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 427, 427 (1997) (arguing force majeure pro-
tection is badly neglected and is frequently “thrown-in” after a “12th-hour request”
without much care or forethought); Timothy Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses
Expose Your Client to Needless Risk, 2018 CONT. L. EMERGING ISSUES, https://
plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/3299585d-52d2-43e2-82a6-ed98b22876df/?con-
text=1530671 (2018) [hereinafter Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses] (acknowl-
edging many attorneys tack generic force majeure clauses onto contracts without
any customization “[a]s if on autopilot”).
161. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (“Force majeure
clauses are among the most misused provisions in the contract drafting milieu, and
a botched force majeure clause can expose clients to enormous risk.”).
162. Indeed, this is the historical goal of the force majeure doctrine.  For a
discussion of the origins and evolution of the force majeure doctrine, see supra
notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
163. See Bryan Torporek, What If The 2019–20 NBA Season Is Over? Explaining
The ‘Force Majeure’ Clause, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bryantoporek/2020/03/13/what-if-the-2019-20-nba-season-is-over-explaining-the-
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most pre-COVID-19 contracts, the NBA’s contracts with its players specifi-
cally listed “epidemic” as a force majeure event that would allow the
league to trim players’ pay for the season.164  Even with the specificity in
the clause, there was very little certainly around the appropriate course of
action.165  The league may have been better off without the force majeure
clause to prevent the threat of triggering the provision.166
Finally, invoking a force majeure event (even for parties with highly
considered and specified contracts) could have potentially catastrophic
business and legal ramifications for all parties.167  For example, invoking
force majeure may advance short-term business interests for a party that
finds itself unable to perform the contract, but it may have negative long-
term effects like a damaged reputation among industry peers and custom-
ers or lead to the termination of a critical contract.168  Furthermore, in-
voking force majeure likely leads to at least some litigation, which
inevitably costs valuable time and money from all parties.169
2. Force Majeure in Practice Is Redundant of Default Common Law Excuses
for Nonperformance
An overly broad force majeure clause can quickly become redundant
of the defenses that, in the absence of a force majeure clause, would have
been available to parties.170  For example, the existing common law doc-
trine of impossibility applies to contracts that cannot be performed due to
force-majeure-clause/ [https://perma.cc/VQ6S-2A5A] (explaining the details of
the contract between the NBA and its players).
164. See Jessica Laske, COVID-19 and Contractual Ramifications: How Force
Majeure Impacts Struggling Sporting Associations Like the NBA in Light of COVID-19
Mandated Closures and Postponements, THE JEFFREY S. MOORAD CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
SPORTS L.J. BLOG, https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/academics/sport-
slaw/commentary/mslj_blog/2020/Covid19andcontractualramifications.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZGS-K6CJ ] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (commenting on how
force majeure impacted the NBA in light of COVID-19 closures and
postponements).
165. See Torporek, supra note 163.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Force Majeure Checklist, LEXISNEXIS
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/da4f9494-560d-45fa-a0bc-
212c1e9e8753/?context=1530671 [https://perma.cc/3DAN-SWCX] (listing the
potential negative business impacts of invoking force majeure).
168. See id. (describing the myriad ways a party could experience unintended
and unwanted long-term consequences by invoking force majeure); see also Gegios
& Duroni, supra note 24, at 14–15 (noting the potential for spoiled business rela-
tionships from invoking force majeure).
169. See Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Force Majeure Checklist, supra note 167 (in-
troducing practical business considerations for companies weighing the option of
invoking force majeure post-COVID-19).
170. See, e.g., Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (noting that
parties often miss out on the benefit of gap-filler defenses by including force
majeure clauses that cover the same ground).
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COVID-19 and government responses to it.171  The doctrine of impractica-
bility is likely to apply to COVID-19.172  To add “pandemic” to the lan-
guage of a force majeure clause would be to eliminate its exclusivity in the
contract itself.173  If a force majeure clause does not add a remedy that
otherwise would not exist, then it is inefficient and ineffective for parties
to go through the potentially arduous process of updating the clause.174
171. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 51–52 (declaring that it is “clear” that the
common law doctrine of impossibility applies “quite directly to contracts under-
mined by COVID-19”).  Schwartz uses an example of a contract with a babysitter to
exemplify how the doctrine of impossibility would apply:
[I]f the babysitter failed to show up because the COVID-19 pandemic
made it physically dangerous . . . to enter your house, the Impossibility
doctrine will come to her aid.  Because the COVID-19 pandemic is an Act
of God and so radically different from the ordinary risks and challenges
of babysitting, and because it makes her performance so much more diffi-
cult and dangerous than expected, the law will excuse her nonperform-
ance pursuant to the doctrine of Impossibility.  The outcome is even
clearer if the government has issued an order for the babysitter to remain
home to avoid spreading the virus . . . .
Id. at 52 (footnote omitted); see also Stephen N. Hollman, Commentary, § 2615
General Comment. Commercial Impracticability, WEST’S CAL. CODE FORMS, (3rd ed.
2020) (declaring that terrorist attacks should not be added to force majeure
clauses because they have “never been the subject of any judicial scrutiny”).  Ter-
rorist attacks are widely accepted as events that render contracts impossible. Id.  If
they could be used to invoke a force majeure clause that specifies impossibility,
then they surely would also meet the requirements to invoke the impossibility doc-
trine. Id.
172. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 53.  In cases where performance is more
burdensome to the point where a party would have to take on a much greater
expense, the added expense could rise to a level where a court would view per-
formance as “effectively impossible.” Id.
173. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 227–28 (noting the importance of exclu-
sivity of the force majeure clause within the contract).  A force majeure clause
should be drafted and interpreted within the context of the whole contract.
Declercq further provides:
Exclusivity is often discussed in relation to the legal doctrines that would
have governed the contract if the force majeure clause were left out.  A
drafter of a force majeure clause should be aware of the issue of exclusiv-
ity because it is within the drafter’s power to determine whether the
clause has a trumping effect or merely a supplementary effect on the le-
gal doctrine . . . . This article posed the question whether the agreement
of the parties to include a force majeure clause in their contract, in itself,
indicates that greater liability or specific risk allocation was contemplated.
It seems that such a presumption is not made and that exclusivity must be
expressly agreed upon.
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Declercq further offers a suggested question that organi-
zations can use to test exclusivity of the force majeure clause in their drafted con-
tracts: “Does a force majeure clause have an exclusive status in relation to the other
provisions of the contract or is the force majeure clause shaped by those other
contractual provisions?” Id. at 228.
174. See id. at 226 (noting instances where “the force majeure clause adds
nothing to the contract”).
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Even worse, the parties could forfeit the benefit of the gap-filler defenses
by including a force majeure clause that covers the same ground.175
A potential common law defense to raise in response to COVID-19 is
the impossibility defense, which requires physical impossibility to excuse
performance.176  The litany of events listed in modern force majeure
clauses like acts of God, terrorism, fire, accidents, and more all point to
the sorts of events that would make performance physically impossible.177
Even though the impossibility doctrine is narrowly applied, it would apply
to events that render performance impossible, thus listing them in a force
majeure clause is redundant.178  This would have been the case in Hitz,
where government shutdowns met the “illegality” exception for the impos-
sibility doctrine.179  When the government mandated that restaurant oper-
ations cease during COVID-19 shutdowns, it rendered the restauranteur’s
performance physically impossible.180  The result of the case may have been
the same had the parties not had a force majeure clause and instead relied
on the readily available doctrine of impossibility.181
Notably, the COVID-19 pandemic may not establish an impossibility
defense for every type of business.182  Because of the narrow application of
the impossibility doctrine, if a business is still permitted to operate and
generate revenue, a court would be unlikely to grant an impossibility ex-
cuse for nonperformance.183  However, for those businesses that have not
175. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (noting that the
force majeure clause supersedes the impossibility doctrine, which is “an ‘off-the-
rack’ provision that governs only if the parties have not drafted a specific assign-
ment of the risk otherwise assigned by the provision”).  For a further discussion,
see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the impossibility doctrine and its applicability as a
common law defense for contract non-performance, see supra notes 78–83 and
accompanying text.
177. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 810 (detailing events commonly listed in
force majeure clauses that render performance physically impossible).
178. For an overview of the impossibility doctrine, see supra notes 68–74 and
accompanying text.
179. See Perrie Weiner et al., The Progression of COVID-19 Force Majeure Litiga-
tion, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1304931/the-pro-
gression-of-covid-19-force-majeure-litigation [https://perma.cc/CHW8-99H8]
(commenting on the government orders in Illinois that made operations impossi-
ble, not just unprofitable, in Hitz).
180. In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) (holding
Illinois governor’s executive order made performance impossible).
181. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
182. See Weiner et al., supra note 179.  For example, a business that is still
permitted to operate and generate revenue may be heavily impacted by COVID-19
and struggling to pay rent, but unable to invoke COVID-19 as a force majeure
event because pandemic-related restrictions did not make generating income to
pay rent impossible. See id.
183. See id. (noting that the impact from the COVID-19 pandemic may be
considered too “attenuated as simply a macroeconomic event that reduces [a] bus-
iness’s profitability” and would not meet the court’s requirements to establish an
impossibility defense for many businesses).
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been directly impacted by government shutdown mandates, the impracti-
cability doctrine provides an alternative common law excuse that would
apply.184
To invoke impracticability as a defense, a party must demonstrate that
performance was made impracticable by an event that the parties assumed
would not occur when the contract was made, and that it was not their
fault.185  The force majeure doctrine has evolved to address the same is-
sues as the default impracticability doctrine.186  Parties often characterize
force majeure events as “unforeseen” contingencies, which precisely fit the
requirements of invoking the impracticability doctrine and do not add an-
ything to the contract through the force majeure clause.187
Crucially, parties not only waste valuable resources in drafting and
including force majeure clauses that are redundant of the already-availa-
ble common law defenses of impossibility and impracticability.188  They
also risk giving up these common law protections by including a generic or
improperly drafted force majeure clause.189  In Aquila, Inc. v. C.W. Min-
ing,190 for example, the court held that the mining company could not
invoke common law excuses for nonperformance because the parties’ con-
tract contained a force majeure clause that expressly spelled out when su-
pervening events would excuse performance.191  The force majeure clause
at the heart of the Aquila case circumvented default, gap-filler contract
doctrines like impossibility and impracticability.192  Thus, when the terms
of force majeure were not satisfied, the court could not extend the com-
mon law doctrines that otherwise would have excused nonperform-
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261.
185. See id.
186. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 801 (describing the evolution of the force
majeure clause).
187. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (detailing the
risks of including a hasty force majeure clause).
188. See id. (“[A]n improperly drafted, generic force majeure clause can leave
the parties with fewer protections than they would have under the law without it.”);
see also Declercq, supra note 16, at 225.  The assumptions courts must make when
force majeure clauses are litigating “devaluate a force majeure clause to zero since
the clause only gives you what would have applied anyway if there were no force
majeure clause at all in a contract.  In such a case, the force majeure adds nothing
to the contract.”  Declercq, supra note 16, at 225.
189. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (“If you’re going
to have a force majeure clause, you need to do it right.”).
190. 545 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
191. Id. at 1264.  The district court held that “CWM cannot rely on common
law defenses and the U.C.C., thereby circumventing the terms and limitations that
the parties negotiated in the Contract.” Aquila, Inc. v. C. W. Mining, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80276, 16 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2007).
192. See Aquila, Inc., 545 F.3d at 1260, 1266 (holding the parties to the terms
of the contract regarding notice, as opposed to the Missouri statute requirements,
because contract terms were binding).
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ance.193  A force majeure clause can limit the applicability of default
common law protections.194
B. Re-drafting Force Majeure Clauses in the Wake of COVID-19: Practical
Advice
For many businesses, it would be most beneficial to scrap the force
majeure clause entirely.195  The existing common law doctrines of impos-
sibility and impracticability, although ubiquitously applied narrowly, do
provide clear relief for most organizations facing disruptions after a global
crisis.196  Boilerplate force majeure clauses will not allocate risk with more
certainty after a global crisis than the common law doctrines.197  If busi-
nesses do maintain their force majeure clauses, they should keep these
points of advice in mind:
1. Make the force majeure clause succinct and specific.
The most effective force majeure clauses (that parties are most likely
to be able to successfully invoke) focus on the effect that force majeure
events are likely to have on the performance of the contract.198  Instead of
listing as many events as they can fathom, drafters should keep the force
majeure clause specific and succinct.199  Furthermore, they should avoid
catchall provisions, which can obscure their actual force majeure agree-
193. Id. (finding that the notice requirement spelled out in the force majeure
clause was not met, and therefore that force majeure could not be invoked as an
excuse for nonperformance).
194. See supra note 188.
195. For a discussion of the ways force majeure clauses can cause more
trouble than good, see supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., No. 20-14695-
BKC-LMI, 2021 B.R. LEXIS 200, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021) (considering the
impossibility and frustration of purpose doctrines to excuse a movie theater opera-
tor’s missed lease payments).  For a further discussion of the Florida bankruptcy
court’s consideration of these doctrines, see supra notes 77–78 and accompanying
text.
197. See Dellinger, supra note 160, at 1619 (“The use of such phrases as ‘act of
God’ or ‘force majeure’ in boilerplate or closely drafted agreements is not and
should not be dispositive.  The crux of the matter is whether the event causing the
alleged impracticability should have been reasonably foreseen and, at bottom,
whether the parties were reasonable in assuming that the event would not occur.”).
198. See Declercq, supra note 16, at 234–35.
199. See id. (suggesting that a contract drafter should not spend time thinking
of every possible event that might occur to then list them in a contract). One
scholar helpfully illustrated this point by using a hypothetical meteor or comet
collision:
If you add “meteor collision with the earth,” but a comet, rather than a
meteor, ends up hitting the earth, a court would likely hold that calamity
not to be covered.  If you exclude the Force Majeure clause entirely, the
court would likely treat a comet collision the same as it would a meteor
crash.
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 60.
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ment.200  This prevents a court from interpreting the clause narrowly and
ultimately serves to better protect the business transaction from unex-
pected challenges because it makes the force majeure apply to these
surprises.201
2. Do not parrot the common law through the force majeure clause.
In addition to potentially allowing for more force majeure coverage,
less expansive force majeure clauses add the alternative benefit of preserv-
ing the option to apply the common law defenses in cases of contract non-
performance.202  Therefore, force majeure clauses should be used to
create new defenses for nonperformance, not take the place of common
law defenses that already exist for all parties.203  If it mirrors common law
doctrines, then it was not necessary to go through the trouble of negotiat-
ing it as a force majeure event and could even make it more difficult for
the parties to successfully invoke a common law defense like impossibility
or impracticability.204  Importantly, a force majeure clause should not re-
quire that force majeure events are unforeseeable, impossible, or impracti-
cable—standards which would effectively make a force majeure clause a
clone of a common law defense.205
3. Use AI-enabled technology to smartly and uniformly update force majeure
clauses.
Businesses that plan to continue using the force majeure doctrine
should be able to readily adapt contracts in response to global crises.206
200. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (“Don’t hide
what you want in the niceties of a generic listing of force majeure events—a court
may not agree that the particular risk is encompassed by it.”).
201. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 60 (identifying the insistence of adding
terms like “pandemic” or “terrorism” to a force majeure clause as “fight[ing] the
last war”).  As Schwartz aptly notes:
There are countless other disasters that might come to pass in the future
and make performance more difficult, from super-volcanoes to meteors
colliding with the earth. If you try to list all of these in a Force Majeure
clause, they will be interpreted narrowly, and you may well fail to include
the one that eventuates.
Id. at 60 (footnote omitted).
202. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160.
203. For a discussion on how force majeure clauses are frequently redundant
of the impossibility doctrine, see supra notes 179–87 and accompanying text.
204. See Murray, Botched Force Majeure Clauses, supra note 160 (detailing the
risks of including a force majeure doctrine, which can eliminate the option of
using the common law defenses that would otherwise be available to parties).
205. See id. (advising that force majeure clauses should never use the same
language that the court would otherwise apply to determine whether a party could
successfully invoke a common law defense for nonperformance).
206. See Tyler Marion et al., Improving Contract Management Post-COVID-19: Be-
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AI-enabled technology can help ensure that all parties remain clear about
all contract provisions if and when the contract changes after a crisis
event, including resolution clauses and notice requirements.207
IV. REBUILDING CONTRACTS AFTER COVID-19
COVID-19 had an unprecedented reach into every aspect of life
across the globe, including business transactions.208  As legal scholars and
practitioners navigate contract disputes in the post-pandemic world, they
agree that having a force majeure clause that specifically references
“epidemics” or “pandemics” would be most helpful to a party seeking con-
tract relief for nonperformance, but acknowledge that very few contracts
contained pandemic-specific language before COVID-19 started to spread
across the globe.209  There is ongoing litigation and discussion around
how force majeure clauses may provide relief for organizations affected by
COVID-19, whether they have included language related to the pandemic
in their clauses or not.210
The COVID-19 pandemic will likely shape our lives for decades to
come.211  Many parties have started litigating contracts that were not per-
formed in the early months of the pandemic, often looking for refunds or
some sort of other remedy.212  In fact, almost every federal circuit is was
(recommending proper review and analysis of past contracts in light of future
global crises that could impact contracts in manners similar to COVID-19).
207. See id. (promoting the use of AI-enabled technology which, along with a
“proven process” and “the right expertise” will help organizations as they face any
future crises).
208. See Gegios & Duroni, supra note 24, at 14 (noting the far reach of
COVID-19’s impact).
209. See Adam Schramek, Force Majeure in the Age of Coronavirus, 83 TEX. B.J.
303, 303 (2020) (predicting that parties that already have “pandemics” or
“epidemics” in their contracts will have the easiest path to obtaining contractual
relief).
210. See id.
211. See Megan Scudellari, How the Pandemic Might Play Out in 2021 and Be-
yond, NATURE MAG. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-
02278-5#ref-CR1 [https://perma.cc/B7WX-N5EW] (reporting predictions from
scientists and epidemiologists around the globe whose COVID-19 forecasting mod-
els, despite differences in precise timelines, show that “COVID-19 is here to stay”);
see also Coronavirus Will Change the World Permanently. Here’s How., POLITICO MAG.
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/
coronavirus-effect-economy-life-society-analysis-covid-135579 [https://perma.cc/
DWB9-EHX3] (detailing predictions of how COVID-19 would permanently re-
order society in dramatic ways, including fundamental changes to the ways Ameri-
cans approach religious worship, physicians provide care using telemedicine, and
communities vote for elected officials).
212. See, e.g., Leandra Bernstein, College Tuition Lawsuits Target High Costs of
Online Education During COVID-19, WJLA (Sept. 1, 2020), https://wjla.com/news/
nation-world/college-tuition-lawsuits-target-high-costs-of-online-education-during-
covid-19 [https://perma.cc/JL9M-C95B](summarizing tuition and class schedul-
ing changes at American universities, and how many student groups have initiated
litigation to pursue tuition reimbursement); Jayme Butcher et al., COVID-19 Litiga-
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reviewing a case litigating force majeure and contract law in the wake of
COVID-19 before the end of 2020.213  Businesses need to know how they
should be adjusting contracts to prepare for a continuously unknown fu-
ture as the world recovers from the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic.214
Despite the fact that COVID-19 is “unprecedented,” the reality is that
a wide variety of global crises have shaken contracts around the world al-
ready in this century; they will continue to do so.215  COVID-19 is just the
latest global crisis to challenge contractual relationships.216  Practitioners
should be preparing for the future, not just responding to COVID-19, as
they weigh their options in redrafting contracts for a crisis-filled world.217
For many organizations, it is not efficient or helpful to add “pandemic” to
an existing force majeure clause; instead, the additional negotiations
would only cause short-term business delays and the broader clause would
cause long-term challenges by eliminating the opportunity use common
law defenses that would otherwise be available.218  Force majeure clauses
have become overly broad and narrowly applied to the point of providing
no additional source of relief for contracting parties.219  Practitioners
tion Report – August 2020 #2, JD SUPRA (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/covid-19-litigation-report-august-2020-2-56298/ [https://perma.cc/2J3J-
MZLG](reporting emerging contract litigation tracked by Blank Rome LLP, in-
cluding an event organizer who refused to refund tickets to a Florida-based event
that was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, parents that filed suit against a
travel insurer after their kids were not able to attend summer camp in New York,
and Philadelphians who demanded a refund after the 2020 Broad Street Run was
changed to a virtual event).
213. Bloomberg Law, Civil Cases Including “COVID-19” and “Force Majeure”,
BLOOMBERG L. DOCKET SEARCH, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/start [https://
perma.cc/MPD8-QLKE](click “Docket Search” then search for the terms “COVID-
19” and “force majeure” in United States courts) (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
214. For an overview of practical considerations for businesses intent on keep-
ing force majeure clauses in contracts, see supra notes 195–207 and accompanying
text.
215. Previous global crises like terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and eco-
nomic recessions prompted force majeure litigation, as well as scholarly predic-
tions of how an inevitable pandemic could wreak havoc in contract courts.
Unfortunately, such global crises will continue to undoubtedly plague the globe in
unexpected and unwelcome ways. For a brief discussion of previous global crises,
see supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
216. Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 58 (“This will not be the last pan-
demic that renders performance more difficult than anticipated.  Pandemics have
happened in the past and will certainly return, just like hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, and war.”)
217. See Schwartz, supra note 8, 58–59 (writing on the importance of drafting
for future pandemics and other crises).
218. For a discussion of the redundancy of the force majeure clause and com-
mon law defenses, see supra notes 170–94 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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should resist the urge to pile on more and more potential force majeure
events “just in case.”220
220. For a discussion of the dangers of making a list of force majeure events
that is overly broad, see supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
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